简介:Thispaperstudiesdynamicpricingandcooperativeadvertisingstrategiesinatwo-memberchannelofdistribution.Weproposedifferentialgamemodelsthatincorporatethecarryovereffectsofadvertisingovertimeforbothmanufacturerandretailer.Twodifferentmodelsarestudied.Firstly,wediscussedanon-cooperativedifferentialgamewhichthemanufacturersupportspartiallythecostofthepromotionactivities.Secondly,bothchannelmemberscooperativelydeterminetheirrespectivestrategies.Inthesetwocases,dynamiccooperativeadvertisingandpricingstrategiesarecharacterized.Thennumericalsimulationmethodisappliedtoanalyzethesensitivityofmainmodelparametersandcomparethemainresultsofthetwomodels.Thesimulationresultsshowthatthecooperativemodelachievesbettercoordinationthanthenon-cooperativemodelwiththefollowingfeatures:allchannelmembersachievehigheradvertisingeffortsandprofitlevelinthecooperativecaseratherthanindienon-cooperativecase.
简介:Inthispaper,weaddressabasicproductionplanningproblemwithpricedependentdemandandstochasticyieldofproduction.Weusepriceandtargetquantityasdecisionvariablestolowertheriskoflowyield.Thevalueofriskcontrolbecomesmoreimportantespeciallyforproductswithshortlifecycle.Thisisbecause,theprofitimplicationsoflowyieldmightbeunbearableintheshortrun.WeapplyConditionalValueatRisk(CVaR)tomodelthe.risk.CVaRmeasureisacoherentriskmeasureandtherebyhavingniceconceptualandmathematicalunderpinnings.Itisalsowidelyusedinpractice.Weconsidertheproblemundergeneraldemandfunctionandgeneraldistributionfunctionofyieldandfindsufficientconditionsunderwhichtheproblemhasauniquelocalmaximum.Wealsobothanalyticallyandnumericallyanalyzetheimpactofparameterchangeontheoptimalsolution.Amongourresults,weanalyticallyshowthatwithincreasingriskaversion,theoptimalpriceincreases.ThisrelationisoppositetothatofinNewsvendorproblemwheretheuncertaintyliesindemandside.
简介:Thispaperconsidersafirmthatsellsadurableproductwithagivenmarketpotential.Thepurposeofthefirmistomaximizeitsprofitbydetermininghowmuchcapacitytoinstallbeforethesaleshorizon,howmanyproductstoproduceinaccordancewiththecapacity,andhowmanyproductstosellbypricing.AppealingtoPontryaginmaximumprincipleincontroltheory,theauthorsobtaintheclosed-formsofalloptimaldecisionsthefirmshouldmake.Furthermore,theoptimalproductionrateandoptimalsalesratearebothequaltothedemandrate,whichiscausedbytheoptimalpricingpolicyduringthewholehorizon,andtheoptimalpricingpathisincreasingwiththecostofinstallingaunitofcapacity.Furthermore,numericalanalysisrevealsthevisualimpressionoftherelationshipoftheparameters.
简介:Thepaperstudieschannelchoicedecisionsinamulti-channelsupplychainunderastrategywherethereisanex-antecommitmentmadeontheretailpricemarkup.Themarketdemandisuncertainanddependentonthepriceandsalesefforts.Theresultsshowthatinanychannelstructure,whenmakingorderdecisionstheretaileronlyexaminesthepriceratioandthefluctuationsizeofrandomdemand,ratherthanthechannelcostandtheretailer’smarketingefficiency.Whentheretailpricerises,themanufactureriswillingtoincreaseinventoryquantityfordirectsales,becausethemanufacturer’sprofitmarginishigherindirectchannel.Theincreaseindemandfluctuationonlyaffectsthedegreeofchannelpreferencebutdoesn’tchangethemanufacturer’schannelchoice.Nomatterinwhichlevelthepriceratiois,whenthesalesefficiencyofretailchannelisnothighorthedemandproportionofdirectchannelislow,themanufacturerandtheretailerwillbebothapttochooseadual-channelstructure.Thenaddingadirectchannelbecomesamarketingstrategy,ratherthanacompetitoroftheretailchannel,andhelpsthesupplychainwinmoremarketdemand.