简介:Thispaperstudiesaservicefirmwhosebusinesstimecanbedividedintoseveralperiods,eachprovidingdifferentvaluetocustomers.Heterogeneousserviceisamajorreasonresultinginimbalancesbetweensupplyanddemand.Sincecustomersdifferintheirdegreeofimpatience,firmscanusedifferentialpricingmechanismstooptimizetheirobjectivesandmatchsupplywithdemandineachperiod,byinducingcustomerstochoosedifferentperiods.Westudytwotypesoffirms,aninternalfirm,theobjectiveofwhichistomaximizethesystem′s(includingthefirmandallthecustomers)totalnetvalue,andacommercialfirm,whichaimstooptimizeitsownprofit.Thoughimpatiencefactorsarecustomers′privateinformation,foreachtypeoffirm,wederivetheoptimalincentivecompatiblepricingpolicy,underwhichallthecomingcustomerswillfollowthefirm′sassignment,thatis,patientcustomerswillbuytheserviceinhigh-valueperiods,buttheirwaitingtimewillbelonger,whileimpatientcustomerswillenterintothelow-valueperiods,buttheywillbecompensatedbyshorterwaitingtimes.Furthermore,intheinternalfirm,wealsoprovethatthismechanismenablesthedecentralizationofdecisions,whilemaintainingcentralizedsystem-wideoptimality.Numericalanalysisshowsthatwhenthereissufficientcapacity,theinternalfirmdoesnotalwaysneedtosetlowerpricesthanthecommercialfirmineveryperiod.
简介:我们学习一个汇编器生产一个最后的产品满足价格的一个集会系统敏感;不明确的要求。最后的产品需要的一个单位从n输入各从一个不同供应商提供的互补部件。从供应商的汇编器订单;他们的关系被价格唯一的合同管理。汇编器练习二个其他的定价计划:她处于所有市场状况由修理零卖价格的一个固定定价计划,;她在观察实际需求以后由调整零卖价格的一个应答的定价计划弯。我们发现当汇编器练习二个定价计划时,供应商收取一样的批发价格,隧道利润根据一样的比例在公司之中被分配,;在在集中的决定makings下面的关于那些的分散的决定makings下面的系统的相对表演是一样。而且,应答的定价改进汇编器的绝对表演,;获得忽略到供应商以更高的利润;到顾客以提高的产品可获得性;降低的市场价格。
简介:这篇文章在优秀通货膨胀的存在下面与消费者参考质量效果学习联合定价和动态产品质量投资的一个问题。最佳的控制模型被构造与一个有限优秀投资能力最大化全部的利润,在需求对历史的产品质量水平敏感的地方。为有限、无限的计划地平线的最佳的优秀投资策略被根据Pontryagins最大的原则解决这些最佳的控制模型分别地给,它随着时间的过去与引用质量效果使最佳的优秀投资的准确轨道能被描绘。另外,一个有效算法被设计为系统产生最佳的联合定价和动态优秀投资政策。有限计划地平线和无限的计划地平线的策略之间的主要差别是后者是一个常数。我们的学习显示公司在整个计划地平线一路上增加优秀投资从来不是最佳的。当考虑参考质量的影响时,优秀投资的水平更高。而且,数字例子被给说明理论结果的正当。另外,敏感分析被执行显示出系统参数怎么影响最佳的政策,并且一些经理的建议被介绍。
简介:Thechangesofnumerairecanbeusedasaverypowerfultoolinpricingcontingentclaimsinthecontextofacompletemarket.Byusingthemethodofnumerairechangestoevaluateconvertiblebondswhenthevalueoffirm,andthoseofzero-couponbondsfollowgeneraladaptedstochasticprocessesinthispaper,usingItotheoremandGisanovtheorem.Aclosed-formsolutionisderivedunderthestochasticvolatilitybyusingfastFouriertransforms.
简介:Thecross-fertilizationbetweenartificialintelligenceandcomputationalfinancehasresultedinsomeofthemostactiveresearchareasinfinancialengineering.Onedirectionistheapplicationofmachinelearningtechniquestopricingfinancialproducts,whichiscertainlyoneofthemostcomplexissuesinfinance.Intheliterature,whentheinterestrate,themeanrateofreturnandthevolatilityoftheunderlyingassetfollowgeneralstochasticprocesses,theexactsolutionisusuallynotavailable.Inthispaper,weshallillustratehowgeneticalgorithms(GAs),asanumericalapproach,canbepotentiallyhelpfulindealingwithpricing.Inparticular,wetesttheperformanceofbasicgeneticalgorithmsbyusingittothedeterminationofpricesofAsianoptions,whoseexactsolutionsisknownfromBlack-Scholesoptionpricingtheory.Thesolutionsfoundbybasicgeneticalgorithmsarecomparedwiththeexactsolution,andtheperformanceofGAsisewluatedaccordingly.Basedontheseewluations,somelimitationsofGAsinoptionpricingareexaminedandpossibleextensionstofutureworksarealsoproposed.
简介:在这份报纸,我们分析定价决定和依靠异构的出售力量在二个时期卖它的产品的一个公司的赔偿策略。卖能力的出售代理人是他们的私人信息并且将决定卖努力的代理人的有效性。我们介绍三赔偿合同策略,即分享,分开半、分开公司能在时期一并且由使用原则代理人理论采用,在每策略在二个时期为公司导出最佳的赔偿合同和最佳的价格。比较这三合同策略,我们发现为公司的最佳的策略取决于折扣因素。我们证明公司将肯定出现在为某小折扣因素,并且为分享合同的某大折扣因素的时期一分开合同肯定在时期一被规定。然而,分开半的合同可以被考虑因为一些调停打折因素,并且不能也在时期一为所有折扣因素出现。当分享合同在时期一被提供并且当分开合同在时期一被提供时,与折扣因素增加时,我们的分析也表明最佳的价格与折扣因素减少。
简介:MotivatedbytheresetoptionwithnpredetermineddatesanalyzedbyW.Cheng,weconsiderakindofresetoptionwithuncertaindatesbyintroducingNpre-specifiedbarrierlevels.Weclaimthisresetoptionconsistsofsomestandardknock-inandknock-outbarrieroptions.Theclosed-formpricingformulaisderivedbymeansofaPDE'sapproach.
简介:Thispaperstudiesdynamicpricingandcooperativeadvertisingstrategiesinatwo-memberchannelofdistribution.Weproposedifferentialgamemodelsthatincorporatethecarryovereffectsofadvertisingovertimeforbothmanufacturerandretailer.Twodifferentmodelsarestudied.Firstly,wediscussedanon-cooperativedifferentialgamewhichthemanufacturersupportspartiallythecostofthepromotionactivities.Secondly,bothchannelmemberscooperativelydeterminetheirrespectivestrategies.Inthesetwocases,dynamiccooperativeadvertisingandpricingstrategiesarecharacterized.Thennumericalsimulationmethodisappliedtoanalyzethesensitivityofmainmodelparametersandcomparethemainresultsofthetwomodels.Thesimulationresultsshowthatthecooperativemodelachievesbettercoordinationthanthenon-cooperativemodelwiththefollowingfeatures:allchannelmembersachievehigheradvertisingeffortsandprofitlevelinthecooperativecaseratherthanindienon-cooperativecase.
简介:能力获得和定价决定是一公司长期的战略决定。然而,多重产品的需求无常和substitutability引起困难解决能力和定价决定问题。在这份报纸,我们与需求无常和比赛探讨一个多重产品定价和多重资源能力获得问题。在要求前为每个资源和产品价格决定能力承诺的公司需要被认识到以便全部的利润被最大化。如果需求超过承诺的能力,额外的数量能从点市场被购买。费用被考虑的可变单位生产费用,能力获得和维护。我们首先分析一个单个公司基本问题并且在价格和能力上发现最佳的答案。基于单个公司模型,我们探讨越过产品并且越过公司价格比赛因素考虑的二产品的、二公司的能力承诺和定价问题。价格和能力承诺上的平衡的存在和唯一被证明,然后我们延长了结果到多重产品,多重公司大小写。
简介:Theauthorsanalyzeafinitehorizon,singleproduct,periodreviewmodelinwhichpricingandinventorydecisionsaremadesimultaneously.Demandsindifferentperiodsarerandomvariablesthatareindependentofeachotherandtheirdistributionsdependontheproductprice.Pricingandorderingdecisionsaremadeatthebeginningofeachperiodandallshortagearebacklogged.Orderingcostisaconvexfunctionoftheamountordered.Theobjectiveistofindaninventoryandpricingpolicymaximizingexpecteddiscountedprofitoverthefinitehorizon.Theauthorscharacterizethestructureoftheoptimalcombinedpricingandinventorystrategyforthismodel.Moreover,theauthorsdemonstratehowtheprofit-to-gofunction,orderuptolevel,reorderpointandoptimalpricechangewithrespecttostateandtime.
简介:Thispaperemploystherealoptiontheorytodevelopapricingmodelforthetransferofpropertyrights.Welisttheconditionsforthegood,intermediateandbadfirmsrespectively,andworkouttheclosed-formsolutiontotheequilibriumtransferprice,theoptimaltransfertiming.Usingthecomparativestaticanalysis,wefindthatforgoodfirmsthetransferpriceofthetargetisincreasinginitscapital.Thehigherthecapitalofthetargetowns,thefasteritwillbetransferred.Forintermediateandbadfirms,similarconclusionscanbederived.Thelargergapbetweentheacquirer'ssizeandmarketpowerandthoseofthetarget,thelowerthetransfertriggeredprice.Thetransferpricegoesupasthecapitalratiooftheacquireroverthetargetdiminishes,whileitisdecreasingintheamountofthecapitalthetargetowns.
简介:Withthedeepenofmarketcompetition,productpricingandproductiondecisionprobleminmanyfirmshavebecomemoreandmoreimportant.Abilevelmodelisproposedtodescribethepricingandproductiondecisionswithfuzzydemandandfuzzycostparameters.Theupperlevelistodeterminetheoptimalpriceandproductionquantitywithcapacityconstraints.Usingthisinformation,thelowerlevelproblemtriestostructurearesponse(thedistributionpatternofcustomers(ormarkets))thatwillsatisfyhisdemandatminimumcost.AndaftertransformingthefuzzynumbersintothecrispvaluebyGradedMeanIntegrationRepresentationmethod,thesolutionalgorithmbasedondifferencemethodisgiven.Finally,theapplicationofthemodelanditsalgorithmareillustratedwithasimpleexample.