Thispaperstudiesaservicefirmwhosebusinesstimecanbepidedintoseveralperiods,eachprovidingdifferentvaluetocustomers.Heterogeneousserviceisamajorreasonresultinginimbalancesbetweensupplyanddemand.Sincecustomersdifferintheirdegreeofimpatience,firmscanusedifferentialpricingmechanismstooptimizetheirobjectivesandmatchsupplywithdemandineachperiod,byinducingcustomerstochoosedifferentperiods.Westudytwotypesoffirms,aninternalfirm,theobjectiveofwhichistomaximizethesystem′s(includingthefirmandallthecustomers)totalnetvalue,andacommercialfirm,whichaimstooptimizeitsownprofit.Thoughimpatiencefactorsarecustomers′privateinformation,foreachtypeoffirm,wederivetheoptimalincentivecompatiblepricingpolicy,underwhichallthecomingcustomerswillfollowthefirm′sassignment,thatis,patientcustomerswillbuytheserviceinhigh-valueperiods,buttheirwaitingtimewillbelonger,whileimpatientcustomerswillenterintothelow-valueperiods,buttheywillbecompensatedbyshorterwaitingtimes.Furthermore,intheinternalfirm,wealsoprovethatthismechanismenablesthedecentralizationofdecisions,whilemaintainingcentralizedsystem-wideoptimality.Numericalanalysisshowsthatwhenthereissufficientcapacity,theinternalfirmdoesnotalwaysneedtosetlowerpricesthanthecommercialfirmineveryperiod.
