简介：Thetrendofresearchinggroupradiofrequencyidentificationdevices(RFID)authenticationprotocolhasbecomeincreasinglypopularinrecentyears.OneofthenewestworkinthisareaisfromBatinaandLee,theypresentedaprivacy-preservingmulti-playersgrouping-proofprotocolbasedontheellipticcurvecryptography(ECC),andclaimedtheirprotocolhavetheabilitytoresistfivepotentialattacks,includingcompromisedtagattack,man-in-the-middleattack,colludingtagsattack,etc.Inthispaper,wefirsttakeacounterexampletodemonstratetheirprotocolisvulnerabletocompromisedtagattack.ThenweproposeanovelsecureRFIDauthenticationprotocol,andanalyzeitssecuritybymergingformalanalysis,provablesecurity,andmathematicalinductivemethod,soastosolvetheweaknessofBatinaandLee'swork.Furthermore,comparedwithanothertwoclassicprotocols(secureownershiptransferprotocol(SOTP)andsecuremultiplegroupownershiptransferprotocol(SMGOTP)),theperformanceanalysisshowthatourprotocolprovidesnotonlyalowertags'communicationcostatabout50.0%and14.3%,butalsoalowerreader'scomputationcost(approximate14.5%and55.1%respectively),whentransferringalargenumberoftags.

简介：Opportunisticnetworksarederivedfromdelaytolerantnetworks,wheremobilenodeshavenoend-to-endconnections.Nodesarerepresentedbypeople,whichmeansthatopportunisticnetworkscanberegardedassocialnetworks.Humanmobilityplaysanimportantroleinaffectingtheperformanceofforwardingprotocolsinsocialnetworks,furthermore,thetrajectoryofpeople'smovementsaredrivenbysocialcharacteristics.However,currentroutingprotocolsrelyonsimplemobilitymodels,andrarelyconsidersocialcharacteristics.Consideringtwoheterogeneousnetworkmodels,ansocialopportunisticnetworksrouting(SONR)wasproposedwhichbringsanadapteddiscreteMarkovchainintonodes'mobilitymodelandcalculatesthetransitionprobabilitybetweensuccessivestatus.ComparisonwasmadebetweenSpray,WaitandEpidemicprotocol.SimulationshowthatSONRcanimproveperformanceondeliveryratio,deliverylatencyandnetworkoverhead,meanwhile.SONRapproachestheperformanceofEpidemicrouting.

简介：Recently,Liuetal.[Commun.Theor.Phys.57(2012)583]proposedaquantumprivatecomparisonprotocolbasedonentanglementswappingofBellstates,whichaimstosecurelycomparetheequalityoftwoparticipants’informationwiththehelpofasemi-honestthirdparty(TP).However,thepresentstudypointsoutthereisafatalloopholeinLiuetal.’sprotocol,andTPcanmakeBell-basismeasurementtoknowalltheparticipants’secretinputswithoutbeingdetected.Tofixtheproblem,asimplesolution,whichusesone-timeeavesdroppercheckingwithdecoyphotonsinsteadoftwiceeavesdroppercheckingwithBellstates,isdemonstrated.Comparedwiththeoriginalprotocol,itnotonlyreducestheBellstatesconsumptionbutalsosimplifiestheprotocolsteps.